History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.

But the Athenians pursued them not far, because the Syracusian horsemen, being many and unvanquished, whensoever any men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them and still drave them in again;

but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again and erected a trophy. The Syracusians, having rallied themselves in the Helorine way and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent a guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should take the treasure there, and returned with the rest of the army into the city.

The Athenians went not to assault the temple, but gathering together their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and stayed that night upon the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty; and gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty. And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana.

For it was now winter; and to make war there, they thought it yet unpossible before they had sent for horsemen to Athens and levied other amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over-mastered in horse; and before they had also both levied money there and received more from Athens and made league with certain cities, which they hoped after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto, and before they had likewise provided themselves of victuals and other things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse again.

With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana. The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an assembly;

and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt.

And yet in that they were not so far inferior as it was likely they would have been, especially being (as one may say) homebred artificers, against the most experienced in the war of all the Grecians.

That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders—for there were fifteen that commanded in chief—and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice; and both of these would still grow greater: skill, by practising with danger; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill.

And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them to let them lead the army wheresoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed and all things would be put in readiness with order and less tergiversation.

The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised and elected three generals, him, Heracleides, the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, the son of Exekestus.