History of the Peloponnesian War

He likewise advised Tissaphernes

not to be in too great a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; nor to be anxious, by either bringing the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or giving pay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer on the same party the command both of land and sea; but to let them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the power at all times to lead the one party or the other against those who were annoying him.

If, on the contrary, the command both by land and sea were united, he would be at a loss for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger; unless he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the contest with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a trifling share of the expense, and at the same time with security to himself.

And the Athenians, he said, were a more desirable people to share the empire with him; for they were less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war with both a profession and a practice most advantageous to him; as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as the sea was concerned, to themselves and to him all the Greeks who lived in the king's country; while the other party, on the contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor was it likely that the Lacedaemonians should at the present time be liberating the Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians; [*](ἢν μή ποτε αὐτούς, κ. τ. λ.] I have followed Haack's and Poppo's interpretation of this passage, nisi si quando eos (Athenienses) non everterint, rather than Herman's, who supposes that the word μή only increases the force of the negative: nisi hi barbari Graecos, quos sub ditione suâ tonerent, etiam delevissent ) unless they should ever fail in reducing the Athenians.

He urged them therefore to wear them both out at first, and after cutting off as much as possible from the power of the Athenians, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from his country.

Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far at least as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but by telling them that the Phoenician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigour of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in cooperating with them.

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, whilst he was with them, both because he thought it best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest.

And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted,] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals amongst them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them: but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.