History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even f no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected, severally, that they might have attacked them also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labours.

But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer.

The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to their resources, would in all probability be with them in great force with the spring.

And thus being on every account full of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they would both be released in future from all dangers, like that which would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if they had won Sicily in addition to their other dominion; and that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy n safety the supremacy over the whole of Greece.