History of the Peloponnesian War

Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's strength and their own difficulties were every day increasing, sent, on his side also, to Athens; having, indeed, on many other occasions sent messengers at the time of their several operations, but doing so then especially, because he thought that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those at home recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no small reinforcement, there was no hope of preservation for them.

Fearing, however, that those who were sent by him, either through incapacity for speaking, or through being deficient [*](γνώμης.] In corroboration of Arnold's argument for this reading in preference to μνήμης, compare the three requisite qualifications of an orator, mentioned II. 60. 5, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων, εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων, κ. τ. λ.) in sense, or from a wish to say something to please the multitude, should not report the real facts of the case, he wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any other, the Athenians would learn his own sentiments, without their being at all obscured by the messenger, and so would deliberate on the true state of the case.

Accordingly, those whom he sent departed with the letter and all that they were to say; while he himself attended to the affairs of the armament, being engaged now in precautionary measures, rather than in perils voluntarily incurred.