History of the Peloponnesian War

When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon;

but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

On that day, then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.

Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much towards the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the centre of the Athenians, intercepted him also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbour, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.