History of the Peloponnesian War

Such were the views which Nicias was positive in stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance with the state of affairs in Syracuse, and their want of money; and because there were some who were desirous that the state should fall into the hands of the Athenians, and were sending messages to him not to abandon the siege; and at the same time, [*](θαρσήσει κρατηθείς.] I have given what appears to me the only sense that this participle can bear, though different from any that has been attributed to it by others. Compare the somewhat similar use of the verb ἡσσῶμαι, in the sense of yielding, or giving way to, e. g. III. 38. 5, ἡδονῆ ἡσσώμενοι; and with a genitive, IV. 37. 1, ἡσσηθεῖεν τοῦ παρόντοςδεινοῦ. If, however, it should be thought that neither this meaning, nor (to use the words of Arnold) any other, can be fairly extracted from the text as it now stands, I should be disposed to adopt a rather bolder emendation than the mere substitution of κρατυνθείς, which Bauer and so many others after him have admitted, but which, as Poppo observes, leaves the passage scarcely less strange in its phraseology than before. From the fact that six MSS. have γ᾽ ἂν, instead of γοῦν, it seems probable that an infinitive mood originally formed part of the sentence; and I venture therefore to propose the following correction: καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν (or γ᾽ ἂν, whichever may be preferred) ναυσὶν ἢ πρότεσρον θαρσήσας κρατήσειν, taking κρατήσειν in the same absolute sense as κρατεῖν has already borne in a very similar passage, ch. 47. 3. If the objections urged by Göller against understanding μᾶλλον before ἢ be thought valid, his correction ᾖ may be admitted; from feeling confident that they should at any rate have the advantage at sea, as they had formerly; i. e. before their recent defeat in the naval engagement.) because he was influenced by confidence in his fleet, at any rate more than before.

Demosthenes, however, would not at all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure them; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favour of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land.

In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view.

But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.