History of the Peloponnesian War

"For you, to whom I am writing, know that [*](ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος.] Or, as others take it, that the bloom of a crew is but of brief duration. But that statement has been already made in the preceding chapter, see 3; and the words which follow are evidently intended to explain this expression.) the flower of a crew is limited in number, and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time.

But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses, (for your tempers are difficult to command,) and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews, (which the enemy can do from many quarters,) but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless.

If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being [*](ἐπολιορκηθέντων.] Literally, compelled to surrender; but the correctness of Arnold's version, which I have adopted, seems proved by the passage quoted by him from I. 131. 2, ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ.) starved out.

I might, it is true, have had more agreeable things than these to write to you, but none more useful, if it is necessary for you to deliberate with a clear knowledge of affairs here. And besides, knowing as I do your temper, that you wish, indeed, to receive the most pleasing statements, but find fault afterwards, should any thing in consequence of them turn out different to what you expected, I thought it safer to lay the truth before you.