History of the Peloponnesian War

"We, on the other hand, could scarcely enjoy this advantage, though with a great superabundance of ships, and though we were not compelled, as at present, to keep guard with all of them. For if we relax our watching even in a slight degree, we shall have no provisions; since even now we find difficulty in bringing them in past their city.

On this account our crews have been wasted and are still wasting; as some of our seamen, in consequence of their fetching wood, of foraging, and of distant watering, are cut off by their cavalry; while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing, desert from us, and those of the foreigners who went on board as pressed men straightway depart to the several cities; while those, again, who were at first elated by the high pay, and supposed that they were going to make money, rather than to fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and every thing else on the side of the enemy offering resistance to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can, ( [*]( And, therefore, as he implies, there were so many points of refuge open to them that their escape was easily effected. See Arnold's note.) and Sicily is a large country;) while in some instances, by engaging in traffic themselves, after persuading the captains to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed the perfection of our navy.

"For you, to whom I am writing, know that [*](ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος.] Or, as others take it, that the bloom of a crew is but of brief duration. But that statement has been already made in the preceding chapter, see 3; and the words which follow are evidently intended to explain this expression.) the flower of a crew is limited in number, and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time.

But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses, (for your tempers are difficult to command,) and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews, (which the enemy can do from many quarters,) but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless.

If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being [*](ἐπολιορκηθέντων.] Literally, compelled to surrender; but the correctness of Arnold's version, which I have adopted, seems proved by the passage quoted by him from I. 131. 2, ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ.) starved out.