History of the Peloponnesian War

"Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now sailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows with the greatest accuracy what we purposed by it: and the generals who still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out in the same way. But that the people there will not escape their attack, unless you succour them, you must now learn.

The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, might still even now gain the victory, if united in one body. But the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been in battle with all their forces, and hemmed in by sea at the same time, will be unable to hold out against the Athenian armament now there.

And if that city is taken, the whole of Sicily also is in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway; and the danger which I just now mentioned as impending from that quarter, would in no long time fall upon you. Let no one then think that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnese also, unless you quickly adopt these measures;

unless, I mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, as, after working their own passage, shall immediately act as heavy infantry; and also, what I consider to be still more serviceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, both to discipline their present forces, and to compel those who are unwilling to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the greater confidence, and those who are doubting between the two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also carry on hostilities here in a more decisive manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may offer the greater resistance;

and that the Athenians may the less easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose you must fortify Decelea, in Attica; a blow of which the Athenians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they think they have not experienced in the present war.

And in that way would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them those things which he knows them to fear most: for it is but reasonable that every people should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear them accordingly. But with regard to the difficulties which, while you benefit yourselves, you will create for your opponents by thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will briefly mention the chief.

Whatever then the country is stocked with, the greater part will come to you, either through being captured, or [*](τὰ δ᾽ αὐτόματα,] i. e. the slaves, which I believe to be chiefly alluded to by the expression οἷς ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύασται, (see note on ch. 17. 3,) though it may also include, as Arnold supposes, cattle, sheep, farm-houses, trees, and other articles of dead as well as live stock.) of their own accord. They will also at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, with the advantages they now derive from their land and their [*](δικαστηρίων,] i. e. in various fees and fines; on which see Boeckh Publ. Oecon. 1. p. 250.) courts of justice; but, especially, of the revenue from the allies, which will be less regularly paid by them, when they consider that the war on your part is now vigorously prosecuted, and so think lightly of them. To have each of these things done with greater speed and spirit rests with you, Lacedaemonians; for that they are possible I am very confident, and I do not think that I shall be proved to have been mistaken.