History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

They, then, with these intentions sailed off to Naxos and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their dead, held an assembly.

And now came forward to them Hermocrates son of Hermon, a man at once second to none in general intelligence, and who had proved himself able in war through his experience, and a person of signal bravery. He encouraged them, and told them

not to submit in consequence of what had happened;

for it was not their spirit that was vanquished, but their want of discipline that had been so injurious. They had not, however, been so much inferior to their enemies as might have been expected; especially since they had been matched against the first of the Greeks— [*]( Or, as Bloomfield renders it, raw-hands. See his note. Poppo reads χειροτέχνας and renders the passage, Quod cum iis qui primi Graecorum peritia (rei militaris) essent, idiotae, propemodum dixerim operrii, pugnassent. ) mere amateurs, so to speak, against regular workmen.

They had also been much hurt by the great number of their generals and the multiplicity of orders, (for their generals were fifteen in number,) and also by the tumultuous insubordination of the troops in general. But should only a few men of experience be elected generals, and prepare their heavy-armed force for service during that winter, by furnishing with arms those who did not possess any, in order that they might be as numerous as possible, and by compelling them to attend to their training also; they would, he said, in all probability have the advantage over their enemies; since courage they already possessed, and discipline for the execution of their measures would thus have been acquired. For both these things would improve; their discipline being practised in the midst of dangers; and their courage growing more confident than ever from being accompanied by the assurance of science.

They ought, then, to elect their generals both few in number and invested with absolute authority; taking to them the oath, 'that assuredly they would allow them to command as they might think best.' For so what ouht to be kept secret would be more effectually concealed; and every thing else would be prepared in due order and without listening to any excuses.