History of the Peloponnesian War

With good courage, then, let us both make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachment of some of them, and endeavour to enter into friendship and alliance with others; while we despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to prove that the danger is common to all; and to Italy, that either we may gain their alliance for ourselves, or they may refuse to receive the Athenians.

I think it better, too, that we should also send to Carthage. For this is nothing unexpected by them; but they are always in fear that they may some time or other find the Athenians coming against their country; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that if they abandoned these places, they would themselves be brought into trouble, they might be willing to assist us; at least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or other. And they are more able to do it, if they please, than any men of the present day; for they possess most gold and silver; and it is by means of these that war, like every thing else, prospers.

Let us likewise send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging them to come hither to our aid as quickly as possible, and to stir up the war there.

And what I think the most expedient course, though you, through your habitual love of quiet, would be least quickly persuaded to adopt it, shall, notwithstanding that, be mentioned. If then we Siceliots—all in one body, if possible; but if not, as many as possible in concert with us—would launch the whole of our present navy, with two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they will not have to fight about Sicily before they have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea; we should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on considering that we are starting from a friendly country as its guardians, (for Tarentum is ready to receive us,) but that for them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament; which would hardly remain in order through so long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it came on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body;

then, if they use their oars, we shall fall on them when they are wearied; or if we should not choose to do so, we may also retire to Tarentum: while they, having crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, would be at a loss what to do in uninhabited regions; and would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they attempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their armament, and would be dispirited, from having no certainty whether the cities would receive them or not. I therefore, for my part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consideration, they would not so much as put out from Corcyra;

but would either, after deliberating and reconnoitring how many we are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of the year into winter; or, in consternation at the unexpected result, break up the expedition: especially since the most skilful of their generals, as I hear, is taking the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return, if any considerable resistance were seen on our part. We should be reported too, I am quite sure, [*]( Literally, on the side of more, or excess; like ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, I. 10. 3) as being more than we really are:

and in accordance with what is told them are men's feelings also affected; and of those who are beforehand in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack them see beforehand that they will defend themselves, they stand in greater fear, considering them equal to the danger And this would be the case now with the Athenians.

For they are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance; with good reason contemning us, because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in destroying them. But if they saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at the power which we really possess.

Be persuaded, therefore to show this boldness, if possible; but if not, then, as quickly as possible, to get ready all other resources for the war; and to think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds; but that, for the present, to consider those preparations most safe which are made with a feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would prove most to your advantage. For those men are both coming against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, and all but here.