History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

"Against such a power then we require, not only [*](ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς,] i. e. a force consisting only of the few fighting men on board the ships. Or even if the seamen themselves were joined with them, yet their want of arms and training for land service would render them a very inefficient and weak force against the troops of Syracuse, on shore, however efficient they might be on their own element.) a marine and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves.

But it were disgraceful to return by compulsion, or to send for fresh supplies afterwards, through having inconsiderately formed our plans at first. On the contrary, we must go against them with sufficient forces, knowing that we are about to sail far from our own country, and not on an expedition of the same kind as when you have gone at different times, in the character of allies, against any of your subjects in these parts, where supplies of additional necessaries were easily obtained from the friendly territory; but departing to a land altogether alien to you, from which for [*](μηνῶν, οὐδὲ τεσσάρων] I cannot at all agree with Poppo's remark: οὐδέ insolentius trajectum cum vv. ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν jungendum est. That would certainly give a suitable and more easy sense to the passage, but if the position in which οὐδέ stands in the great majority of the MSS., and which Poppo himself retains, be the correct one, it seems impossible that it should qualify any other word than τεσσαρ́ων; and in that case its force appears to be what is here attributed to it.) as many as four months in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come here.

"I think therefore that we ought to take many heavyarmed, both of our own and of our allies, whether those who are subject to us, or any in the Peloponnese that we may be able either to prevail upon by argument, or to take into our pay; many bowmen also and slingers, to offer resistance to the Sicilian horse; and that in ships we should have a very decided superiority, in order that we may the more easily bring in what is necessary: while we [*](τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον.] Arnold thinks that τοῦ σίτου would be a better reading; but there is no necessity at all for such a change, if the article be taken as only distinguishing the class of provisions here spoken of from, another, viz. the corn they took with them, in opposition to that which they would get in Sicily, and which is mentioned in the words immediately preceding, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾷον ἐσκομιζώμεθα.) take our corn from home also in merchant vessels, namely, wheat and parched barley, with bakers from the mills, compelled, in proportion to their numbers, to serve for pay; that should we any where be detained by stress of weather, the force may have provisions; (for so numerous as it is, it will not be one for every city to receive.) All other things too we must provide, as far as we can, and not depend upon others; but, most of all, we must take from home as much money as possible. For as for that of the Segestans, which is asserted to be there in readiness, believe that it is in the way of assertion, more than in any other way, that it will be ready.

For supposing us to go hence, not only provided on a scale equal to the enemy, ( [*]( Because as on the one hand it was impossible for the Athenian expedition to match the Syracusan infantry in point of numbers, so on the other hand they were so superior in discipline, that even with a great disparity of numbers they were fully able to cope with them. —Arnold.) excepting, at least, their heavy-armed fighting force,) but even surpassing them in all respects; yet scarcely even then shall we be able to subdue that country, and to save this. Indeed we must consider that we are going to found a city amongst aliens and enemies;