History of the Peloponnesian War

"Against such a power then we require, not only [*](ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς,] i. e. a force consisting only of the few fighting men on board the ships. Or even if the seamen themselves were joined with them, yet their want of arms and training for land service would render them a very inefficient and weak force against the troops of Syracuse, on shore, however efficient they might be on their own element.) a marine and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves.

But it were disgraceful to return by compulsion, or to send for fresh supplies afterwards, through having inconsiderately formed our plans at first. On the contrary, we must go against them with sufficient forces, knowing that we are about to sail far from our own country, and not on an expedition of the same kind as when you have gone at different times, in the character of allies, against any of your subjects in these parts, where supplies of additional necessaries were easily obtained from the friendly territory; but departing to a land altogether alien to you, from which for [*](μηνῶν, οὐδὲ τεσσάρων] I cannot at all agree with Poppo's remark: οὐδέ insolentius trajectum cum vv. ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν jungendum est. That would certainly give a suitable and more easy sense to the passage, but if the position in which οὐδέ stands in the great majority of the MSS., and which Poppo himself retains, be the correct one, it seems impossible that it should qualify any other word than τεσσαρ́ων; and in that case its force appears to be what is here attributed to it.) as many as four months in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come here.