History of the Peloponnesian War

On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succour them? For since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their coming here to attack us.

And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean, by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since if all should remain quiet, or [*]( Or, make distinctions of race in choosing, etc.; according to the reading φυλοκρινοῖεν, which Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield adopt.) nicely choose whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is.

For men do not only defend themselves against a superior when he has attacked them, but also strike the first blow, to prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to portion out exactly how far we wish to hold dominion; but since we are in our present position, we must form designs against some, and not give up others; because we should be, subjected to the rule of another party, if we did not ourselves rule over others.

Nor must you take the same view of quiet as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh institutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that we shall rather aggrandize our possessions here, if we go in quest of those there, let us make the expedition; that we may both prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians, by being seen, regardless of present peace, to sail even against Sicily; and at the same time, by either ruling, as we most probably shall, over the whole of Greece, through being joined by those there, or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.

And as for security, whether for remaining there, in case of any success, or for returning, our fleet will provide us with it:

for by sea we shall be superior to all the Siceliots put together. And let not the non-interfering policy which Nicias recommends in his speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you from your purpose; but acting in your usual order, just as our fathers, by consulting young with old, raised the state to its present height, do ye now too, in the same manner, endeavour to advance it; being convinced that youth and old age can do nothing without each other; but that the period of levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness, will have most power when joined together; and that the state, if it remain quiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and its skill in every thing grow dull; while by entering into contest it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find self—defence habitual to it, not in word, but rather in deed.

My decided opinion then is, that I think a state of no inactive character would most quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely, who regulate their affairs in accordance with their existing habits and institutions, even though they may be of an inferior character, with the least variation.