History of the Peloponnesian War

"And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in subjection by us; but the former, even if we conquered them, we should hardly be able to govern, so far off and so numerous as they are. But it is folly to go against men whom we could not keep under, if we conquered them; while, if we did not succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position as we were before making it.

Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us.

For at present they might, perhaps, come hither as separate states, to oblige the Lacedaemonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire: for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedaemonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians, [*]( i. e. their wish to rescue the cities from the yoke of Syracrse, as they had done from that of Athens.) and by the same principle.

And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time: but if we should meet with any reverses they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is farthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested.

And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedaemonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them, (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained,) you have despised them, and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily.

You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedaemonians are doing ought but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time.

So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us [*]( Or, as Arnold renders it, in the way of oligarchy; i. e. threatening as, not with the loss of our conquests, but with a change of government.) by the spread of oligarchical principles.