History of the Peloponnesian War

For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the equipment of the troops with him, which was such as [*](ἀναγκαίαν οὐσαν, i. e. not such as they would have wished, but such as they could get. Compare II. 70. 1, βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, and I. 61. , ξύμβασιν ἀναγκαίαν. —Arnold.) necessity alone dictated, he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, [*]( Or, and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds. For the different explanations of this strange construction which have been proposed, see Poppo's note, in his last edition; which has been completed since this translation was commenced, and will be always referred to in future, unless the larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position of the τέ seems to show that καταφρονήσεως, as well as προόψεως, is dependent upon ἄνευ. and therefore that the μὴ must be considered as redundant. Or is it possible that it could have been carelessly used with a double force, qualifying at once both ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος and καταφρονήσεως; as it is in a somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2?) and despising them on sufficient grounds.

Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect:

Men of the Peloponnese, with regard to the character of the country from which we are come, namely, that through its bravery it has always been a free country, and that you are Dorians about to engage with Ionians, to whom you are habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice.

But with regard to the present attack, I will explain in what way I purpose making it;

that the fact of your meeting the danger in small divisions, and not in one body, may not cause a want of courage by an appearance of weakness.

For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while, without any order, they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them [*]( i.e. when it is deficient in actual strength, making up for it by art and by rapidity of movement. —Arnold.) with regard to his own power, not so much in an open manner and in regular battle-array, as with reference to his present advantage, that man would be most successful.

And those stratagems by which one would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation.

While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are thinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than remaining; while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed on the centre of their forces.

And do you, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me now charging, and in all probability frightening them, take your division, both the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and suddenly opening the gates rush out against them, and make all haste to close with them as quickly as possible. For we may expect that in this way they will be most alarmed;

since the force which follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than that which is already before him and engaged with him.

And do you be a brave man yourself, as it is natural that you should, being a Spartan; and do ye, allies, follow him courageously; and consider that it is the proof of good soldiership to to be willing, and to be alive to shame, and to obey your commanders. Reflect, too, that on this day you either gain your liberty, if you act bravely, and the title of confederates of the Lacedaemonians; or are slaves of the Athenians—if you fare as well as you possibly can, without being reduced to personal bondage, or put to death—and incur a more galling slavery than before, while you oppose the liberation of the rest of the Greeks.

Do not you, then, act as cowards, seeing for how much you are struggling; and I will show you that I am not better able to give advice to others, than to carry it out in action myself.