History of the Peloponnesian War

All his heavy-armed force too was mustered, about two thousand in number, and three hundred Grecian horse. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas stationed himself on Cerdylium, whilst the rest were posted with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected.

For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmers; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his camp and led them forward.

And [*]( Or τῷ τρόπῳ may be understood, as by Haack and Arnold, of the temper and habits of Cleon's mind. But the aorist tense of the verbs ἐχρήσατο, ἐπίστευσε, and ἤλπισεν seems intended to refer to the single fact of his having adopted a particular plan, and his reasons for doing it, rather than to a continued state of mind, which would rather take the imperfect. And the following description of that plan, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ... ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳπεριστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν, agrees, as closely as the different position of the parties rendered possible, with that of the arrangements for the decisive battle in Sphacteria, which were made by Demosthenes, but the credit of which Cleon would, of course, assume to himself. Compare especially IV. 32. 3, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ᾖ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις, και μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτάξωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει, κ. τ. λ.) he adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm.

Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace.

He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

Immediately that Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he too went down from Cerdylium, and entered Amphipolis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against the Athenians, he made none;

being afraid of his own resources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so much in numbers, (for they were pretty nearly equal,) but in character; (for [*]( Literally, the Athenian force that was in the field had gone forth pare; i. e. free from all such things as might have marred their efficiency: χσηστοῖς καταλόγοις ἐκκριθέν, as he expresses it, VI. 31. 3.) it was the flower of the Athenian force that was in the field, and the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians;) but he prepared to attack them by means of a stratagem.

For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the equipment of the troops with him, which was such as [*](ἀναγκαίαν οὐσαν, i. e. not such as they would have wished, but such as they could get. Compare II. 70. 1, βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, and I. 61. , ξύμβασιν ἀναγκαίαν. —Arnold.) necessity alone dictated, he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, [*]( Or, and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds. For the different explanations of this strange construction which have been proposed, see Poppo's note, in his last edition; which has been completed since this translation was commenced, and will be always referred to in future, unless the larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position of the τέ seems to show that καταφρονήσεως, as well as προόψεως, is dependent upon ἄνευ. and therefore that the μὴ must be considered as redundant. Or is it possible that it could have been carelessly used with a double force, qualifying at once both ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος and καταφρονήσεως; as it is in a somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2?) and despising them on sufficient grounds.

Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect: