History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

As soon as the spring of the next summer commenced, the Argives, finding that the Boeotian ambassadors, whom they said they would send, did not come, and that Panactum was being demolished, and an especial alliance had been concluded by the Boeotians with the Lacedaemonians, were afraid that they might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to the Lacedaemonians.

For they supposed that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians both to demolish Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; and that the Athenians were privy to these measures; so that they themselves had no longer power even to make alliance with the Athenians: whereas they hoped before, in consequence of the existing dissensions, that if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians should not continue, they would, at any rate, be in alliance with the Athenians.

The Argives, then, were involved in these difficulties, and feared they might be engaged in war at once with the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians: and consequently, though they did not before accept the treaty with the Lacedaemonians, but entertained the proud hope that they should enjoy the supremacy over the Peloponnese; they sent as envoys to Lacedaemon, as quickly as they could, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were considered to be the most acceptable persons to them; thinking to live in quiet by making a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, as they best could under present circumstances, [*]( Or, on whatever terms they might be allowed. See Bloomfield's note.) whatever might be the arrangement.