History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

But the following winter, (different ephors happening now to be in office, and not those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them being even opposed to it,) when embassies had come from their confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were there, and they had held many discussions with one another, and come to no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and Xenares—those of the ephors who most wished to break up the treaty—held a private conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to pursue as far as possible the same policy; and that the Boeotians, after first entering into alliance with Argos themselves, should then endeavour to bring the Argives together with themselves into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. For in this way the Boeotians were least likely to be forced to accede to the Attic treaty; since the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives even [*](πρό.] More literally, in the face of. Poppo adopts Dobree's explanation: Pluris enim facturos Lacedaemonians Argivorum amicitiam et societatem quam Atheniensium inimicitiam ac foederum cum ipsis junctorum violationem: i.e. magis illam cupere quam hanc metuere. For the force of καλῶς, in the next sentence, see Arnold's note.) at the risk of the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians were always desirous that Argos should be their friend on fair terms; thinking that so the war out of the Peloponnese would be more easily conducted by them.

They begged the Boeotians, however, to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedaemonians; that by getting back Pylus, if they could, in exchange for it, they might more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians.