History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

At the commencement of the spring of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians immediately concluded an armistice for a year; the Athenians considering that Brasidas would then no longer win any more of their towns to revolt, before they had made their preparations for securing them at their leisure; and at the same time, that if it were for their interest, they might conclude a general peace: while the Lacedaemonians thought that the Athenians feared what they really were afraid of; and that after having a suspension of their miseries and suffering, they would be more desirous, from their taste of it, to effect a reconciliation, and, restoring their men, to make a treaty for a longer time.

For they deemed it of [*]( I have followed Göller in referring τοῖς δὲ to the troops which Sparta would still retain, in opposition to τῶν μὲν, the prisoners whose services she would have lost. Others refer it to the Athenians, while Arnold thinks it corrupt.) greater importance to recover their men at a time when Brasidas was still prosperous: and, [on the other hand,] if he reached a still greater measure of success, and put matters on an equality, they were likely to lose those men, and while defending themselves with their others, on equal terms, still to run a risk of not gaining the mastery.

An armistice was therefore concluded by them and their allies on the following terms: