History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, the- Athenians were reduced to great fear, especially because the town was of service to them by supplying timber for ship building, and in point of payment of revenue; and because, though as far as the Strymon the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to them for reaching the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no further; as on the inland side a large lake, formed by the river, spread for a great distance, while in the neighbourhood of Eion they were watched by cruisers:

but now the passage was considered to have been rendered easy. They were also afraid that their allies would revolt.

For Brasidas both showed himself moderate in other respects, and in his speeches every where declared that he was sent out to give freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, and [*](παρέχεται has generally been supposed to refer to Brasidas; but the introduction of ἐκείνου before πραότητα in the next clause induces me to think that Amphipolis is its subject; and the sense of enjoying is one which it often bears. See 85. 4, πόλιν ἀξιόχρεων παρεχομένους.) what advantages it enjoyed, and the gentleness of Brasidas, were most strongly encouraged to make innovations, and sent secret messages to him, desiring him to come to them, and each wishing to be the first to revolt.

For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as power afterwards showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they;

but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nisaea with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them.

Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedaemonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon.

But the Lacedaemonians did not comply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by the principal men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover the men taken in the island, and to bring the war to a conclusion.