History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

You ought not therefore to hold out any hope, either relying on oratory or purchased with money, of their receiving allowance for having erred through human infirmity. For they did not involuntarily hurt you, but wittingly plotted against you; and it is only what is involuntary what can claim allowance.

I, then, both on that first occasion [so advised you], and now contend that you should not rescind your former resolutions, nor err through three things, the most inexpedient for empire, namely, pity delight in oratory, and lenity.

For pity is properly felt towards those of a kindred temper, ad not towards those who will not reel it in return, but are of necessity our enemies for ever. And the orators who delight us with their language will have a field in other subjects of less importance, instead of one in which the state, after being a little pleased, will pay a great penalty; while they themselves from their good speaking will receive good treatment in return. And lenity is shown to those who will be well-disposed in future, rather than to those who remain just what they were, and not at all less hostile. To sum up in one word, if you are persuaded by me, you will do what is just towards the Mytilenaeans, and at the same time expedient;

but if you decide otherwise, you will not oblige them, but will rather pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in revolting you cannot properly maintain your empire. If, however, you determine to do so, even though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is right, punish these men from regard to expediency, or else give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. Resolve, then, to requite them with the same penalty; and not to show yourselves, in escaping their designs, more insensible than those who formed them against you;

considering what they would probably have done, if they had prevailed over you; especially, as they were the first; to begin the wrong. For it is those who do ill to any one without reason, that persecute him most bitterly, [*]( Göller and Poppo follow Hermann in taking ἀπόλλυνται passively, they are killed by living in suspicion of danger, etc.) nay, even to the death, from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared;

since he who has suffered evil without any necessity, [but by provoking it himself,] is more bitter, if he escape, than one who was an enemy on equal terms. Be not therefore traitors to your own cause;

but bringing yourselves in feeling as near as possible to the actual state of suffering, and reflecting how you would in that case have valued their subjection above every thing, now pay them back in return, not indulging in weakness at the present moment, nor forgetting the danger which once hung over you. Punish these men, I say, as they deserve; and give a striking example to the rest of your allies, that whoever revolts will pay the penalty for it with his life. For if they know this, you will less frequently have to neglect your enemies, while you are fighting with your own confederates.