History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

"It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety: which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Boeotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; front the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty;

and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them [*]( In other words, the fact of their being always at the mercy of the Athenians proved the falsity of the hypothesis of their being on equal terms with them, and therefore the reasonableness of their anticipating the attack which night at any time be made upon them, instead of waiting till it had actually been made. Such I think is the meaning of this very difficult passage.) Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succour speedily;

that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us;

so that it is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores.

And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defence of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succours.

Now their revenue is drawn from their allies; and it will be still greater, if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before [they revolted].

But if you will give us hearty assistance, you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, of which you especially stand in need, and will the more easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their allies, (for every one will then join you more boldly,) and will escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, you will find your advantage in the war more certain.