History of the Peloponnesian War

Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of your opponents, I have called you together; as I do not wish you to be in dread of what is not really to be feared.

For these men, in the first place, because they have been previously conquered by us, and do not even themselves think that they are a match for us, have equipped this great number of ships, and not such as would be merely equal to ours. Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against us—that it is their natural character to be courageous—they feel this confidence for no other reason than because they are generally successful owing to their experience in land-service;

and they think [*]( For an explanation of the confused construction in this passage, see Arnold's note.) it will do the same for them at sea. But this, in all reason, will rather be our advantage now, as it is theirs in that case: for in valour they are not at all superior to us;

but from our being respectively more experienced in one particular service, we are also more confident respecting it. Moreover, the Lacedaemonians lead their allies from regard to their own glory, and bring the greater part of them into dangers against their will;

else, [without such compulsion,] they would have never dared to fight again by sea, after being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their boldness. It is you that cause them a much greater and better-founded alarm, both on the ground of your having previously conquered them, and because they think we should not have faced them if we did not mean to do something worthy our decisive victory.

For when equal to their opponents, men generally come against them, as these do, trusting to their power rather than to their spirit; but those who dare to meet them with far inferior resources, and yet without being compelled, do so because they have the strong assurance of their own resolution.

From this consideration these men fear us more for the inequality of our preparations, than they would have done for more proportionate ones. Many armies, too, have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through want of skill, and others through want of daring;

with neither of which have we now any thing to do. As for the battle, I will not, if I can help, fight it in the strait; nor will I sail in there at all; being aware that for a few skilfully managed and fast-sailing vessels, against a large number unskilfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For one could neither sail up as he ought to the charge, without having a view of the enemy from a distance; nor retire at the proper time, if hard-pressed; and there is no breaking through the line, nor returning to a second charge—which are the manoeuvres of the better-sailing vessels—but the sea-fight must in that case become a land-fight; and then the greater number of ships gain the superiority.

On these points ther I will exercise as much forethought as possible; and do you, remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving the word of command; especially as our post of observation is at so short a distance: and during the action attach the greatest imporance to order and silence, which is of service for operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement more particularly: and repel these your enemies in a manner worthy of your former achievements.

Great indeed is the struggle in which you are engaged, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesians as regards their navy, or to bring nearer home to the Athenians apprehensions for the command of the sea.

Again I remind you that you have already conquered the greater part of them; and the spirits of defeated men will not be what they were, in the face of the same dangers.