History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

Then the Lacedaemonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected;

(particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them therefore in anger;

and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement.

Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for lie was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty;

but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitae, who bordered on the Cydonians.

The commander therefore of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitae laid waste the territory of the Cydonians; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.