History of the Peloponnesian War

By speaking to this effect Pericles endeavoured both to divert the Athenians from their anger towards himself, and to lead away their thoughts from their present hardships.

And in a public point of view they were persuaded by his speech, and were no longer for sending to the Lacedaemonians, but were more resolute for the war; though in their private feeling they were distressed by their sufferings; the commons, because, having set out with less resources, they had been deprived of even those; the higher orders, because they had lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and expensive establishments, and, what was the greatest evil of all, had war instead of peace.

They did not, however, cease from their public displeasure toward him, till they had fined him in a sum of money.

But no long time after, as the multitude to they again elected him general, and committed every thing to him; for on the points in which each man was vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly; but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought that he was most valuable.

For as long as he was at the head of the state in time of peace, he governed it with moderation, and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in his time: and when the war broke out, he appears to have foreknown its power in this respect also.

He survived its commencement two years and six months; and when he was dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated to a still greater degree.

For he said that if they kept quiet and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both towards themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conducted the honour and benefit of individuals; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war.

And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multiude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them; for he did not say any thing to humour them, for the acquisition of power by improper means; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure.

Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language he would dash them down to alarm; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in name it was democracy, in fact it was a government administered by he first man.

Whereas those w o came after, being more on level with each other, and each grasping to become first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, but] even their measures, to the humours of the people.

In consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially the expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of judgment with respect to the people they went against, as that those who had sent them out, by not afterwards voting supplies required by the armament, but proceeding with their private criminations, to gain the leadership of the commons, both blunted the spirit of measures in the camp, and for the first time were embroiled with one another in the affairs of the city.

But even when they had suffered in Sicily the loss of other forces, and of the greater part of their fleet, and were now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out three years, both against their former enemies, and those from Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of their allies who had revolted, and Cyrus, the king's son, who afterwards joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet: nor did they succumb, before they were overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their private quarrels.

Such a superabundance of means had Pericles at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with the greatest ease he could gain the advantage in the war over the Peloponnesians by themselves.