History of the Peloponnesian War

" Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations;

whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet.

With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them:

and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and [*]( i.e. by harbouring the slaves and others who might go over to them.) desertions; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong.

For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land.

But to become skilful at sea will not easily be acquired by them.

For not even have you, though practising from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfection as yet; how then shall men who are agriculturalists and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted to practise, from being always [*](ἐφορμεῖν means properly to lie at anchor, or take up a station, with a hostile purpose; hence, to observe the movements of an enemy, with a view to attack him; or, frequently, to blockade him. ) observed by us with many ships, achieve any thing worth speaking of?

Against a few ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging their ignorance by their numbers; but when kept in check by many, they will remain quiet; and through not practising will be the less skilful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval service is a matter of art, like any thing else;

and does not admit of being practised just when it may happen, as a by-work; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being a by-work to it.