History of the Peloponnesian War

whereas the superiority which they have in point of skill may be attained by us through practice. And to have money for this purpose, we will raise contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own slavery, while we would not spend it to be avenged on our enemies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid suffering by means of this very money, [*]( i.e. as it would be made the instrument of Athenian tyranny, if by submission they allowed them to take it from them. Or, on this very point of money, as Arnold renders it.) through having it taken from us by them.

"We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt, (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong,) and [*]( See ch. 142. 3, where Pericles mentions the two different methods of ἐπιτείχισις, the one, as Arnold explains it, by founding a city in the neighbourhood of Athens, strong enough to interfere with her trade, and be a check upon her power, πόλιν ἀντίπαλον; the other by merely raising one or two forts in Attica, as strong-holds for plundering parties to keep the country in constant annoyance and alarm. ) raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure.

Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne : but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright slavery:

which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas we do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up amongst us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state.

And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped [*]( Or, for surely you have not, through a wish to escape these imputations, betaken yourselves, etc. The play on the words καταφρόνησις and ἀφροσύνη, says Arnold, can hardly be preserved in English: 'A sense of your adversaries' inferiority is so fatal a feeling to those who entertain it, that it more fitly deserves to be called nonsense.' ) these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.

"With regard then to what has been done before, why need we find fault with it at greater length than is expedient for what is doing now? But with respect to what will be hereafter, we must labour for it by supporting what is present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by labours; and you must not change the fashion, if you have a slight superiority now in wealth and power; (for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in abundance;) but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds; since the god has commanded it, and promised to take part with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty;

for even the god himself considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to war; but you will rather come to its support after it has been wronged: for the breakers of it are, not those who defend themselves, but those who were the first aggressors.

So then, since on every ground you have good reason for going to war, and since we all in common recommend this, inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for states and individuals [in our league]; do not defer to assist the Potidaeans, who are Dorians, and are besieged by Ionians, (the contrary of which used formerly to be the case,) and to vindicate the liberty of the rest; since it is no longer possible for them to wait, [*]( The participle περιμένοντας refers to the whole body of the confederate, which is afterwards represented in two divisions by the use of the article with μέν and δέ) while some are already injured, and others will be treated in the same way not much later, if we shall be known to have come together, but not to dare to avenge ourselves:

but considering, allies, that we have reached a point of necessity, and, moreover, that what is mentioned is the best course, vote for the war; not being afraid of the immediate danger, but setting your hearts on the more lasting peace that will result from it. For it is by war that peace is rendered the more stable; but to refuse to pass from a state of quiet to one of war is not equally free from danger.

Being of opinion then that the tyrant state which has set itself up in Greece, has set itself up against all alike, so that it already rules over some, and is designing to rule over others, let us go against it and reduce it; and live ourselves free from danger in future, and give freedom to the Greeks who are now enslaved.

The Lacedaemonians, after they had heard from all what they thought, put the question to the vote of all the allies who were present in succession, both to greater and smaller states alike: and the majority voted for war.

But though they had resolved on it, it was impossible to take it in hand immediately, as they were unprepared; but it was determined that suitable means should be provided by the several states, and that there should be no delay. A year, however, did not pass while they were settling all that was necessary, but less, before they invaded Attica, and openly proceeded to the war.