History of the Peloponnesian War

"We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedaemonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose: [*]( The γὰρ in the succeeding words, χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, refers to a suppressed sentence: "We cannot now blame them; but had they acted differently, we should have had a right to blame them; for those who command others should provide for the welfare of others:—Arnold.) [though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all; as they are also in other respects honoured above all.

Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the high way of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others].

And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of pence For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured; but of brave men, when injured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace.

For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that cannot be trusted.

For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through [*]( See note on I. 32. 3.) the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one [*]( I have followed Göller's reading of ὁμοία; Arnold prefers ὁμοῖα considering it as dependent on the two verbs ἐνθυμεῖται and ἐπεξέρχεται. What we speculate on in our expectations, and what we accomplish in our practice, are wholly different from each other. My chief reason for preferring the former interpretation is, that the article is only used with πίστει, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other passages, where there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. οἵι ἄν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ κ. τ. λ. II. 11. 6. τῇ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμία, τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρασκευάζεσθαι. Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 85. 5. τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ επεξιέναι. For other instances of ὁμοῖος with the force here given to it, see note on ch. 30. 5.) conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.