History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

During the same summer, at the very moment when, for various other reasons and especially because of the recall of Alcibiades, the Peloponnesians were vexed with Tissaphernes, feeling that he was now openly favouring the Athenians, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself in their eyes of these calumnies, prepared to go to Aspendus after the Phoenician ships, and bade Lichas accompany him; but as regards the army he would appoint Tamos in his place, so as to ensure supplies during his own absence. But the story is told in different ways, and it is not easy to be certain what motive he had for going to Aspendus, and why, after going, he did not bring back the ships.

For that the Phoenician ships, one hundred and forty-seven in number, came as far as Aspendus is certain;

but the reason why they did not finish the journey is variously conjectured. Some say that his purpose was to accomplish by his absence what he actually designed—to exhaust by delay the resources of the Peloponnesians (at any rate supplies were furnished no better, but even worse than before, by Tamos, to whom this duty had been assigned); others say that it was with the idea of bringing the Phoenician ships as far as Aspendus and then exacting money from them for their discharge (for in any case he was not intending to make any use of them); and still others say that it was because lie was being denounced at Lacedaemon, and wanted the report to go out that he was not acting wrongly but, as everybody could see, had gone for the ships and these were really manned for service.

To me, however, it seems perfectly clear that it was with the purpose of wearing out the resources of the Hellenes and keeping matters in suspense that he did not bring the fleet—of exhausting them while he was making the journey to Aspendus and delaying there, and also of equalizing them, that he might make neither side stronger by joining it. For if he had indeed wished it, he could, it seems plain, by appearing on the scene have brought the war to a definite conclusion; for by bringing his fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, who, in fact, even as it was were confronting the Athenians with a fleet that fully matched theirs and was not inferior to it.

But that which convicted him most clearly was the excuse he gave for not bringing the ships, when he said that they were not so many as the King had ordered to be collected; but he, on the contrary, would surely have won all the more gratitude in such a case, by saving a great deal of the King's money and obtaining the same results with smaller outlay.

At any rate, whatever his intentions, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians by his orders sent Philippus, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to bring the ships back.

But Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes as well was on his way to Aspendus, sailed thither himself with thirteen ships, promising the army at Samos a sure and great benefit; for he would either secure the ships himself for the Athenians, or else at any rate prevent their joining the Peloponnesians. It is likely that he had long been aware of the purpose of Tissaphernes —that he had no intention of bringing the ships— and wished to prejudice him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians on the score of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be under greater compulsion to join the Athenian side. So he put to sea, laying his course eastward, straight toward Phaselis and Caunus.

When the envoys sent by the Four Hundred arrived at Athens on their return from Samos and reported what Alcibiades had said— urging them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes both of reconciling the army to the people at home and of prevailing over the Peloponnesians—most of those who shared in the oligarchy,[*](Referring, not only to the Four Hundred, but especially to the rest of the citizens who, in 8.69.2, are designated as οἱ ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ.) who were even before this in distress, and would have been glad to be safely rid of the business in any way, were far more encouraged.

And they were already beginning to form groups and criticize the state of affairs, having as their leaders some of the very men who were members of the oligarchy and held office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scelias, and others. These had been among the foremost of those who had taken an active part in the revolution, but being afraid in real earnest, as they said, of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades, as well as of those who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, who they thought might, by acting without the sanction of the greater number, work some harm to the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they wanted to avoid reducing the government to an extreme oligarchy, but maintained that they ought to appoint the Five Thousand in fact and not merely in name, and to establish the government on the basis of a greater equality.