History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

So during this period they had come to a state of bitter contention in Samos, the one party attempting to compel the city to accept a democracy, the other to impose an oligarchy upon the army.

But the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals and such of the trierarchs as they suspected, and chose others in their stead, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

Moreover, they rose in their places and made various recommendations for their own guidance, in particular urging that there was no need to be discouraged because the city[*](ie. Athens.) had revolted from them; for it was the minority who had abandoned them, who were the majority, and also were in every way better provided with resources.

For since they themselves possessed the entire fleet, they would compel the other cities under Athenian sway to make their regular contributions precisely as if their headquarters were at Athens. And they had, in Samos, a state that was not weak; on the contrary, it had come within a very little of wresting from Athens the control of the sea when it waged war with her;[*](In 440 B.C. (1.115.).) and as for the enemy, they would defend themselves against them from the same strong base as before. Furthermore, they were better able, since they possessed the fleet, to provide themselves with supplies than were the people of Athens. Indeed it was because they themselves had been stationed at Samos as an advanced guard that the Athenians at home had even before this commanded the entrance to the Peiraeus;

and now, they added, the others would be brought to such a strait, in case they should not consent to give them back their constitution, that they themselves would actually be better able to exclude them from the sea than the others to exclude them.

Trifling and indeed insignificant was the help which the city was able to give them in overcoming the enemy, and they had lost nothing, seeing that the people at home were able neither to send them money any longer— the soldiers now providing it for themselves—nor to give them good counsel, which is the object for which a state exercises control over armies in the field. Nay, even in this respect[*](ie. in giving them good counsel (ἐν τῷ βούλευμα χρηστὸν παρέχειν.)) the other party had erred in abolishing the laws of their fathers, whereas they themselves were trying to preserve them and would endeavour to compel the oligarchs also to do so. Thus the men in the army who could give good counsel were at least as good as those in the city.

Alcibiades, furthermore, if they would merely secure for him immunity from punishment and restoration from exile, would gladly procure for them the alliance of the King. Finally, and most important of all, if they should wholly fail to attain their ends, so long as they possessed so large a fleet there were many places of refuge where they could find both cities and territory.