History of the Peloponnesian War

For in a case where it would be possible to fight at a later time, after leisurely and adequate preparation and possessing full information as to the number of the enemy's ships they must meet and how many of their own they would have, he would never, he declared, yielding to the consideration of disgrace, hazard a decisive battle unreasonably.

It was not disgraceful, he said, for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion, but it would be more disgraceful if under any circumstances whatever they should be defeated and have to make terms. The state would incur, not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger; for, after their past misfortunes, it was scarcely permissible for it when securely prepared of free will, or[*](ie. when not fully prepared.) through absolute necessity, to take the offensive in any direction, much less was it permissible, when there was no pressure, to rush into self-chosen dangers.

He urged them, therefore, as speedily as possible to take up their wounded and their forces on land and whatever stores they had brought with them, leaving behind, however, the spoils they had taken from the enemy's country, in order that the ships might be light, and sail back to Samos;

then, making that their base, after bringing all their ships together, they might sally forth for attacks if opportunity should offer anywhere. As he advised, so he also acted;

and consequently, though not on the present occasion more than afterwards, nor as regards this decision only, but in general in whatever circumstances he found himself, Phrynichus won the reputation of being a man of sagacity. Thus the Athenians, their victory incomplete, retired from Miletus immediately after nightfall; and the Argives, in all haste and indignant at what had happened, sailed home from Samos.