History of the Peloponnesian War

The division of Nicias was about fifty stadia ahead; for Nicias marched his men more rapidly, thinking that in the circumstances safety lay, not in standing firm and fighting of their own choice, but in retreating as rapidly as possible, fighting only as they were forced to do so.

But it was the fortune of Demosthenes to be for the most part in more continual trouble because, being far in the rear on the retreat, the enemy pressed upon him first, and now also, when he saw the Syracusans in pursuit, he was more taken up with ordering his troops for battle than with pressing forward, and so wasted time until he was surrounded by the enemy and both he and his men were in a state of utter confusion. For huddled together in a plot of ground surrounded by a wall, on either side of which a road passed, there being inside the wall a considerable number of olive trees, they were pelted with missiles from every side.

And the Syracusans had good reason to adopt attacks of this kind rather than contests at close quarters; for to risk their lives against men in despair was not now to their advantage, so much as to that of the Athenians. Besides, they considered that success was already assured; therefore everyone spared himself somewhat, not wishing to throw away his life before the end, and they all thought that even as it was, and following this manner of fighting, they would subdue and capture the enemy.