History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

During the night, finding their army in wretched plight, since by now they were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults made by the enemy, it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes to kindle as many fires as possible and then withdraw the army, not now by the route which they had at first planned, but in the opposite direction to that in which the Syracusans were watching for them—that is, towards the sea.

(But previously the line of march which I have been describing had not been toward Catana,[*](ie. towards the sea.) but toward the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela and the cities in that region both Hellenic and Barbarian.)

So they kindled many fires and then set out during the night. And just as in all armies, and most of all in the largest, terrors and panics are apt to arise, especially at night and when they are marching through a hostile country with the enemy not far away, so confusion fell upon them also.

The army of Nicias, as it was in the van,[*](cf7.78.2.) kept together and got a long distance ahead, but that of Demosthenes, about half or more of the whole, became separated and proceeded in considerable disorder.

Nevertheless at dawn they reached the sea, and taking the road called Elorine marched on, intending when they reached the river Cacyparis[*](Modern Cassibili.) to follow this stream up into the interior of the island; for they hoped that the Sicels, whom they had sent for, would meet them in that region.

But when they came to the river, there also they found a Syracusan guard blocking the way with a wall and a palisade. Forcing their way past them, they crossed the river and advanced again towards another river, the Erineus;[*](Modern Cavallata.) for their guides bade them take that route.