History of the Peloponnesian War

but the sailors refused to embark, because they were utterly dejected by their defeat and felt that it was no longer possible for them to win. So they were now unanimously of the opinion that they must make their retreat by land.

But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their intention and thinking that it would be a serious matter if so large an army, retreating overland, should settle somewhere in Sicily and be disposed to renew the war upon Syracuse, went to those in authority and explained that they ought not to permit the Athenians to withdraw during the night—giving the reason which led him to this opinion—but that the Syracusans and their allies should immediately march out in full force and build barricades across the roads and forestall the enemy by guarding the narrow passes.

Now the officials were as firmly of this opinion as Hermocrates and thought that these steps should be taken, but since the soldiers had as yet hardly had the rest they so eagerly desired after the great battle and, besides, there was a festival—for the Syracusans happened on this day to be offering a sacrifice to Heracles—they believed it would be no easy matter to induce the men to answer the summons; for in their great joy over the victory most of them had taken to drinking at the festival; and “We expect,” they said, “that they would obey any orders from us rather than to take up arms and march out.” So when it was clear to the officials, considering all these things, that the plan was impracticable, and Hermocrates was no longer making any impression upon them, he himself thereupon devised the following plan:

fearing that the Athenians might leave quietly during the night and get through the most difficult places before they could prevent this, he sent certain of his own friends with some horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. These rode up close enough to be heard and called upon certain persons by name, as though they were friends of the Athenians—for there were some who regularly reported to Nicias all that went on in Syracuse[*](cf. 7.48.2.)—and bade them tell Nicias not to lead his army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to withdraw at his leisure, in the daytime, after having made full preparations.

After saying this these men departed, and those who had heard reported it to the Athenian generals.

So the Athenians, in view of the announcement, in which they saw no trickery, stayed on for that night. And since, even as things were,[*](ie., though an immediate departure seemed forced on them by the circumstances.) they had not set out immediately, it seemed to them best to wait during the following day also, in order that the soldiers might pack up what was most useful, as well as they could in the circumstances, and then be off, leaving everything else behind and taking along only such of the supplies on hand as would serve for the sustenance of the body.

But the Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead of them with their infantry and blocked up the roads in the country by which it was likely that the Athenians would travel, set guards at the fords across the streams and rivers, and posted themselves, at such points as seemed favourable, for the reception of the Athenian army, with the intention of opposing its progress. They also sailed up with their ships and began to haul down the Athenian ships from the beach and tow them away; the Athenians themselves had already, it is true, burned some few of their ships, as had been their purpose with the whole fleet,[*](cf. 7.60.2.) but all the rest the Syracusans, at their leisure and without opposition, taking them one at a time according as they happened to have run aground, lashed to their own ships and brought to the city.