History of the Peloponnesian War

To such effect Nicias spoke with confidence, because he had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, both of their lack of money and that a party existed there that wished the government to come under the control of the Athenians and was constantly making overtures to him to keep him from withdrawing; and at the same time, though beaten in the field, he had as much confidence as ever in the fleet at any rate.

Demosthenes, however, would not consent on any consideration whatever to continue the siege; if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus or to Catana. From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of the country and support themselves by ravaging the enemy's property, and at the same time do him damage; and as for the fleet, they would thenceforth do their fighting, not in a narrow space, which was more in the enemy's favour, but in the open sea, where there was plenty of room and the advantages of skill would be on their side, and they would not have to make their retreats and advances setting out from and falling back into a scant and circumscribed base.

To sum up his position in a word, he said that he did not at all approve of remaining any longer in the same place, but urged that they should now as quickly as possible move to another place and make no delay.

And Eurymedon concurred with him in these views. But since Nicias objected, some hesitation and delay ensued; and at the same time there was a suspicion that it was because of some superior knowledge that he insisted. And so in this way the Athenians delayed to the end and continued to remain where they were.