History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

The Athenians were at first thrown into a tumult by the sudden attack of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but drew up to meet them. But Gylippus halted near them under arms and sent forward a herald to say that if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce.

They, however, treated the messenger with contempt and sent him back without any answer. After this they prepared for battle against one another.

But Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in a state of confusion and could not readily get into line, led his troops back into the more open ground. And Nicias did not lead the Athenians against him, but kept quiet near his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not coming up, he led his army off the field to the height called Temenites, and they bivouacked there.

But on the next day he led out the main body of his army and stationed it opposite the walls of the Athenians, in order to prevent their sending reinforcements to any other point; then, sending a detachment against the fort at Labdalum, he captured it and put to death all whom he took in it; for the place (it should be explained) was not within sight of the Athenians.

On the same day, too, an Athenian trireme that was keeping watch at the mouth of the Great Harbour was captured by the Syracusans.