History of the Peloponnesian War

"You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space,[*](Or, “the really efficient part of a crew is always small.”) and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time.

But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses;[*](Or, “the men we brought with us must serve for our present force as well as make up for our ever-recurring losses.”) for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this.

And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;

and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.