History of the Peloponnesian War

"We, on the contrary, could hardly enjoy this advantage even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled, as now, to use them all for guard-duty. For if we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp.

And our crews have been and are still being wasted, for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry. And now that we have been reduced to equal terms with the enemy, our servants are deserting. Of the mercenaries also, some, who embarked on our ships under compulsion, go home to their cities on the first opportunity; others, who were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay and thought they were going to make money rather than to fight, now that, contrary to their expectation, they see on the enemy's side the fleet and everything else offering resistance, either go over as professed[*](ie. as they would profess after they had got within the enemy's lines. Or, “on any occasion for deserting,” ie. whenever the deserters thought themselves unobserved by the Athenians or found themselves in the neighbourhood of the Syracusan troops, πρόφασις being used not of a pretended, but Of a real occasion, as in 1.23.6, 1.118.1, 1.126.1, .) deserters, or get away as best they can—for Sicily is large—and there are also some who, being themselves engaged in traffic, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, and thus have robbed our navy of its perfection of discipline.

"You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space,[*](Or, “the really efficient part of a crew is always small.”) and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time.

But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses;[*](Or, “the men we brought with us must serve for our present force as well as make up for our ever-recurring losses.”) for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this.

And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;