History of the Peloponnesian War

"That such were the objects of the expedition which has sailed, you have heard now from one who knows most accurately what we purposed; and the rest of the generals will, if they can, carry out these plans without change. But that the people over there cannot hold out unless you aid them, let me now show you.

The Siceliots have indeed less military experience than the Athenians, yet if they were united in one body they could, even as it is, gain the victory. But the Syracusans alone, being already worsted in battle with their full force and at the same time hemmed in at sea, will be unable to withstand the army of the Athenians now there.

And if this city shall be taken, all Sicily is theirs, and so presently will Italy be also; nor will it be long before the danger which I have just now predicted from that quarter would fall upon you.

Therefore let nobody think that you are deliberating about Sicily only, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you do quickly the following things: send thither by ship such a body of troops as, after working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites; also what I consider even more indispensable than the army, a Spartan as commander, that he may organize the forces already present and press into service those that are unwilling. For in this way the friends you have already will be encouraged, and those who are in doubt will come over with less misgiving.

And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops.

You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica,[*](The occupation of Deceleia took place in 413 B.C. (cf. 1.xix.).) the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly.

But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold[*](ie. a fortress built to dominate an enemy's territory.) and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender.[*](αὐτόατα, refers to slaves, who were part of the “stock.”) And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts,[*](The fees and fines arising from the adjudication of cases brought by the allied states.) they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.