History of the Peloponnesian War

"And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before,[*](In 427 B.C., when Camarina stood with the Leontines and other Chalcidians against Syracuse; cf. 3.86.2.) flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans.

And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them.

We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental cities[*](ie. with infantry and cavalry, our forces being purely naval.); whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines;

and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense.

But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.