History of the Peloponnesian War

Lamachus maintained that they ought to sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and their consternation was at its height.

For every army, lie argued, is always most formidable at first, but if it delay before coming into sight, men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle.

And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city.

And as for the rest of the Siceliots, if we follow this course they will at once be more likely, not to make an alliance with the enemy, but to come over to us, and not to make delays, looking about to see which side will be the stronger. And he said, finally, that they should return and make a naval base and a watch-station at Megara, since it was uninhabited, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.