History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

But Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians stirring, went down himself from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis.

But he did not march out and draw up against the Athenians, because he mistrusted his own force, believing them to be inferior, not in numbers—as they were about equal—but in quality; for the force that was in the field were Athenians of pure blood and the pick of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he was preparing to attack by means of a stratagem;

for he thought that if he showed the enemy the number and the barely sufficient equipment of the troops with him he should be less likely to gain a victory than if they had no previous sight of his forces and did not look upon them with contempt from seeing their real character.

Accordingly, picking out for himself one hundred and fifty hoplites and assigning the rest to Clearidas, he determined to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, thinking that he could not again cut them off thus isolated if once reinforcements should reach them. So calling together all the soldiers, wishing to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke to them as follows: