History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected.

For when the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them.

He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,[*](cf. 5.6.2.) not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms.

Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle;

for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.