History of the Peloponnesian War

It so happened, too, that directly after the battle at Amphipolis and the withdrawal of Rhamphias from Thessaly neither side undertook any further military operations, and both were more inclined to peace. The Athenians were so inclined because they had been beaten at Delium,[*](cf. 4.100., 4.101) and again at Amphipolis a little later, and consequently had no longer that confidence in their strength in reliance upon which they had earlier refused to accept the truce, as they then thought that with their existing good luck they would prove superior.

They were afraid, too, of their allies, lest, elated over these failures of theirs, the revolt among them might spread, and they repented that they had not come to terms when a good opportunity offered after the affair at Pylos.

The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, favoured peace because the war was turning out contrary to their hopes. They had expected that in a few years, if they should ravage their territory, they could pull down the power of the Athenians; whereas they had met with the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, such an one as had never before befallen Sparta; their territory was ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and always there was apprehension that those who remained, relying on those beyond the border,[*](ie. those who had escaped.) might revolt in the present state of affairs, just as they had done before.[*](The great revolt of the Helots, called the Third Messenian War; cf. 1.101.-1.103)

It happened also that the thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring,[*](It expired the next year (cf. 5.28.2), and therefore dated from 457 B.C.) and the Argives were unwilling to make another treaty unless the territory of Cynuria[*](cf. 4.56.2.) were restored to them; and it seemed impossible to carry on the war with the Argives and the Athenians at the same time. Besides, they suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed did happen.

In consideration of these things, both parties thought it advisable to come to an agreement, especially the Lacedaemonians, because of their desire to recover the men captured at Sphacteria; for the Spartiates among these were men of high rank and all alike kinsmen of theirs.[*](i.e., of the Lacedaemonians in authority. The Spartiates formed a clan; besides their common descent, they were closely connected by intermarriage. Or reading, with the schol., ἦσαν γὰρ ο ἵ σπαρτιᾶται αὐτῶν κτλ., “for there were among them some Spartiates of the first rank and related to the most distinguished families.”)

Accordingly, they began negotiations directly after their capture, but the Athenians were not at all inclined, as long as they were getting on well, to make a settlement on fair terms. When, however, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, the Lacedaemonians knew immediately that they would now be more ready to accept offers, and they concluded the truce for a year, during which they were to come together and consult about a treaty for a longer period.

But when the Athenians had met defeat at Amphipolis also and both Cleon and Brasidas had been killed—the men who on either side had been most opposed to peace, the one because of his success and the reputation he had derived from the war, the other because he thought if quiet were restored he would be more manifest in his villainies and less credited in his calumnies—then it was that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who had been of all the generals of his day most successful in his commands—men who had most zealously supported the cause of peace each in the interest of his own state—urged this course with greater zeal than ever. Nicias wished, while his record was still free from disaster and he was held in esteem, to preserve his good luck to the end, and not only at present both to rest from toil himself and to give his fellow-citizens a rest, but also to hand down to after times a name as of one who had lived his life through without injuring the state; and he thought that a man might achieve such a result by keeping out of danger and by least exposing himself to the caprices of fortune, and that it was peace only that offered freedom from danger. Pleistoanax, on the other hand, was for peace, because he was constantly maligned by his enemies about his return from exile, and because, whenever any reverses occurred, he was always spitefully recalled to their thoughts by these persons as though these misfortunes were due to his illegal restoration.

For they charged that he, along with his brother Aristocles, had bribed the priestess at Delphi constantly to answer the Lacedaemonians, whenever they came to consult the oracle: “Bring back the seed of the demigod, son of Zeus, from the foreign land to your own; otherwise you shall plough with a silver plough-share”[*](ie. as the schol. explains, there would be a pestilence, and they would buy food at a very high price, as it were using silver tools.);

and that in course of time she had induced the Lacedaemonians to bring him back from banishment in the twentieth year[*](427 B.C. since he had left the country in 446. cf. 1.114.2 and 2.21.1.) with like dances and sacrifices as when at the founding of Lacedaemon they had first enthroned their kings. For he had fled for refuge to Mt. Lycaeum,[*](A mountain in Arcadia on which was an ancient sanctuary of Zeus.) on account of his retreat from Attica, that was thought to be due to bribery, and through fear of the Lacedaemonians had occupied at that time a house whereof the half was within the sanctuary of Zeus.

Vexed, therefore, by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no calamity would occur and, moreover, the Lacedaemonians would be recovering their men, he himself would not be exposed to the attack of his enemies, whereas so long as there was war it must always be that the leading men would be maligned in the event of any misfortunes, he became very ardent for the agreement. During this winter they kept attending conferences;

and toward spring there was a menace of warlike preparation on the part of the Lacedaemonians, orders being sent to the cities as though for the erection of a fortress to overawe the territory of the Athenians, that they might be more inclined to listen to terms; and at the same time as the result of their conferences, in which each party had filed many claims against the other, an agreement was finally reached that they should make peace, each party to restore to the other the territories which they had gained by war, though the Athenians were to keep Nisaea.[*](cf. 4.69)(For when they had demanded back Plataea, the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place, not by force, but because the Plataeans had come over to them by agreement and not through betrayal[*](cf. 3.52.2.); and the Athenians claimed to have obtained Nisaea in the same way.) At this time the Lacedaemonians summoned their own allies, and when all the rest had voted to stop hostilities, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians—to whom the negotiations were displeasing—they made the agreement, ratifying it by libations and oaths with the Athenians, and the Athenians with them, on the following terms:—