History of the Peloponnesian War

So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide.

For there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger,[*](Or, as Shilleto, “leaning in calculation to considering that security was hopeless, they rather took precautions . . .” cf. Schol., ῥέποντες δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωτοι τοῖς λογισμοῖς πρὸς τὸ υὴ ἐλπίζειν τινὰ πίστιν καὶ βεβαίοτητα.) since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others.

And it was generally those of meaner intellect who won the day; for being afraid of their own defects and of their opponents' sagacity, in order that they might not be worsted in words, and, by reason of their opponents' intellectual versatility find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they boldly resorted to deeds.

Their opponents, on the other hand, contemptuously assuming that they would be aware in time and that there was no need to secure by deeds what they might have by wit, were taken off their guard and perished in greater numbers.