History of the Peloponnesian War

"Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited[*](This has not been definitely stated above, but it is implied in ch. ii 3, v. 4.) us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenes[*](ie. from the Delian Confederacy.) and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards.

Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before.

For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts,[*](cf. 3.7.2.) part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land;

but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk of his own for the country of another.

For though Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war will not be in Attica,[*](ie. the war will not be decided in Attica.) as some think, but in those countries from which Athens derives its support. The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and they will be still greater if they shall subdue us;

for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources will be added to hers, and we should be treated with greater rigour[*](Especially as regards the tribute which would be exacted.) than those who have long been slaves.

But if you give us your hearty support, you will add to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing of which you still stand most in need, and you will find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually drawing their allies away from them—for every one will be emboldened to come over to your side—and you will free yourselves of the reproach under which you have heretofore laboured, of refusing[*](cf. 1.69.1, 5.) to aid those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you openly play the part of liberators,[*](cf. 2.8.4.) the more certain will be your victory in the war.