History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.

Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was caused as great as any in this war.[*](This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten years of the Peloponnesian War), for in Thuc. 8.96.1 we read that a panic occurred greater than any before (τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ... ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὶν παρέστη).)For the inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and were all but sailing into their own harbour-as indeed might easily have happened if the enemy had resolved that there should be no flinching;

and no mere wind would have prevented them. But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, and embarking in haste and with much confusion sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their landforces to guard the Peiraeus.

The Peloponnesians had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward Nisaea; to some extent too there was apprehension about their own ships, which had not been drawn down into the sea for a long time and were anything but water-tight.

On reaching Megara they withdrew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, closing up the harbour[*](i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed by a chain.) as well as taking other precautions.