History of the Peloponnesian War

"Observing that you have become alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I have called you together, because I do not want you to be in dread of imaginary dangers.

For, in the first place, it is just because these men have been beaten before, and do not even themselves believe that they are a match for us, that they have provided themselves with this large and disproportionate number of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,— the thing on which they chiefly rely when they come against us, as if it were their peculiar province to be brave,—the only reasonable ground they have for confidence is that their experience in fighting on land has generally brought them success, and so they think this will achieve the same result for them at sea as well.

But in all reason the advantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their side have it on land: for in valour assuredly they are nowise superior, but we are both more confident just as in any way we have more experience.

Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies for their own glory, the majority of them have to be dragged into battle against their will, for otherwise they would never, after their decisive defeat, have attempted to fight a second time at sea.

Hence you need not fear their daring. On the contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater and better justified, both because you have already defeated them and because they think that you would not be facing them at all unless you expected to achieve a result commensurate with the very great odds.

For most men, when, like our present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely more upon their strength when they advance to the attack thLn upon their resolution; whereas those who dare oppose them with greatly inferior numbers, and at the same time without being compelled to do so. must possess in a high degree the quality of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things into consideration, our enemies have come to fear us more on account of what is amazing in our conduct than they would if our preparations were less out of proportion to their own.

Furthermore many an army has before now been overthrown by smaller numbers through its own want of experience, and sone too through a deficiency of daring, and at this moment we can be charged with neither.

As for the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a large nulnber of ships which are badly managed. For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship to ram her side, through not having a clear view of her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when hard pressed; and there is no chance for such manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirling around to rain, though these are precisely the proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in that case it is the larger fleet that wins.

For these matters, however, I shall make provision to the best of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of command, especially since the two fleets are at watch so near one another; and when it comes to action, regard discipline and silence, which are generally advantageous in warfare, but especially so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits.

The contest is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea.

Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of them[*](In the first sea-fight, the Peloponnesians had forty-seven ships (Thuc. 2.83.3) against Phormio's twenty (Thuc. 2.83.1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven ships (Thuc. 2.86.4). Since the Peloponnesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (Thuc. 2.84.4), the expression “most of them” is not quite exact here.) already; and when men have once suffered defeat, their spirit is never the same as before if they are called upon to face the same dangers."