History of the Peloponnesian War

" If anyone thinks that this course is indeed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this consideration he will be breaking off the truce,[*](The thirty-years' truce with Sparta, cf. Thuc. 1.23.4.) he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid;[*](i.e. of themselves breaking the truce.) whereas, if he reject our alliance, his confidence[*](i.e. in the security of the truce.) will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong. He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the interests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious consideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences.

For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting voyage either to Italy or Sicily,[*](Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than sail through the open sea.) so that you could prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Peloponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here;

and in other respects it is a most advantageous place. And by one briefest concluding word, which embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, you will be convinced that you should not abandon us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us first and you thus let two of these fleets become united, you will have to fight on the sea against both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but if you accept us, you will be able to contend against them with your navy augmented by our own.

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the Corinthians as follows: